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Abstract
This paper explores the relationship between a prominent version of the relational view
of memory and recent work on forms of unsuccessful remembering or memory errors. I
argue that unsuccessful remembering poses an important challenge for the relational view.
Unsuccessful remembering can be divided into two kinds: misremembering and confabulat-
ing. I discuss each of these cases in light of a recent relational account, according to which
remembering is characterized by an experiential relation to past events, and I argue that
experiential relations do not adequately distinguish between successful and unsuccessful
remembering. This is because there are, on the one hand, cases of remembering that do not
instantiate the relevant experiential relations, and, on the other hand, cases of confabulation
and misremembering that do instantiate the relevant experiential relations. I conclude by
suggesting that any successful relationalist attempt to explain remembering needs to come
to grips with unsuccessful remembering.
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1 Introduction
While a historically prominent view, relationalism about memory has only recently begun to be
explored by contemporary philosophers of memory. In a relatively recent paper, Debus (2008)
has attempted to revive interest in relationalism about memory by developing a version of the
view in a more contemporary setting. According to the relational view of memory offered by her,
recollective remembering, or memory of particular events or objects, is fundamentally a matter
of being experientially related to those events or objects. This experiential relation is said to put
us in a more basic relation of acquaintance with the things remembered, such that they become
constitutive parts of our memories. To illustrate with an example, when I remember my college
graduation, the relationalist says, I am acquainted with the event of my college graduation, such
that it would impossible for me to have a memory of this event, or to individuate it as such, had
the event not occurred (2008, 415).
The relational view can be motivated on at least two different grounds. The first is epistemo-
logical: the relational view, Debus says, “must be true if we accept (as we should) that people
can sometimes gain knowledge about the past on the basis of their [recollective memories]”
(Debus 2008, 406—7). The second motivation is semantic: the relational view “must be true if
we accept (as we should) that subjects can form certain beliefs about the past on the basis of an
[recollective memories], and that they can understand the propositions they endorse in holding
on to the relevant beliefs” (Debus 2008, 407). The basic thought here is that, to account for the
fact that we sometimes gain knowledge of the past, and for the fact that we form beliefs about
the past—and understand those beliefs—we need an account of recollective memory in which it
puts us in a relation of acquaintance with the relevant past events or objects.
Despite these motivations, the relational view has been met with skepticism by philosophers
of memory. One common criticism that is often raised as soon as one begins to speak of a
relational approach to memory is that it is simply wrong to characterize recollective memory
in terms of an experiential relation to the past. While, following relationalists or naı¨ve realists
about perception (Campbell 2002; Martin 2004; Fish 2009; Brewer 2011), it may seem natural to
think of perception as an experiential relation to events and objects, and while it may be tempting
to draw an analogy between perception and memory—indeed, Debus is very clear on the fact
that her relational account is inspired by relational or naı¨ve realist accounts of perception—it
is a mistake, the objection goes, to think of memory as an experiential relation to, or a form
of acquaintance with, past objects or events. This is because, unlike in perception, where the
objects perceived almost always co-exist with perceptual experiences, and as such, they are the
kind of thing that one can be acquainted with, the objects of memory have ceased to exist at the
time in which one remembers, and hence are not the kind of thing that one can be acquainted
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with. Either the relational view commits to some form of eternalism (e.g., Bernecker 2008), or
the kind of relation involved in recollective memory is not an experiential relation.
For my purposes in this paper, I will set this line of criticism aside, as it has been pursued
elsewhere in the literature (Michaelian 2016a; Sant’Anna 2018a; Sant’Anna and Michaelian
2019, and will grant the relationalist that there is a plausible way to conceive of memory as
being an experiential relation to past events. I will focus here on a different line of criticism to the
relational view that is based on the possibility of unsucessful remembering, or memory errors.
By extracting an analysis of remembering from the relational view developed by Debus (2008), I
will argue that it cannot properly distinguish between successful occurrences of remembering—
when we remember an event that happened—from unsuccessful occurrences of remembering—
when we seem to remember an event that happened, but incorrectly (misremembering), or when
we seem to remember an event that did not happen (confabulating). The focus on unsuccessful
remembering, or memory errors, will allow us to evaluate the prospects of the relational view in
relation to recent developments in philosophy of memory.
I proceed as follows: In Section 2, I start by discussing the relational view of memory as
developed by Debus (2008). In Section 3, I move on to outline an analysis of remembering ex-
tracted from the relational view. In Section 4, I introduce the idea of unsuccessful remembering
and argue that the relational view, as formulated by Debus (2008), is unable to distinguish appro-
priately between successful and unsuccessful remembering. Section 5 concludes by addressing
a few objections to the main argument.
2 The relational view of memory
The relational view developed by Debus (2008) says that what is characteristic of remember-
ing is that subjects stand in an experiential relation to the past events. The term “experiential
relation” is a technical one, and since it is central to her account, it will be helpful to examine
it more carefully. As Debus points out at the beginning of her paper, she is concerned with
recollective memories, which, according to her, are memories that have experiential characteris-
tics. Recollective memories are, roughly speaking, equivalent to what psychologists call today
episodic memories (see Tulving 1972, 1985). In other words, they are memories of particular
events that one experienced in the past, such that, when one remembers, it seems to one that
one is “re-experiencing” or “re-living” the relevant event (Tulving 2002). Thus, those memories
have similar characteristics to sensory perception, in the sense that we seem to “see”, “hear”,
“smell”, and so on, the relevant features associated with the original event, but now “inside” our
minds.
Being able to “re-experience” or “re-live” an event requires, in turn, that one experienced
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the relevant event in the past. It is important to note that, when one remembers, one is not
literally having another perceptual experience of the event, but is rather undergoing a differ-
ent kind of mental state that has a distinctive relationship to the past event, namely, a specific
kind of experiential relationship. So, while it is true that both perception and memory have
experiential characteristics, and while it is arguably the case that both put us in an experiential
relation to their objects, the relevant experiential relation instantiated in each case is different.
For Debus, the experiential relation instantiated in the case of memory is characterized as one
that supervenes on specific causal, temporal, and spatial relations that hold between subjects and
the past events. The relation is causal because, as she points out, when one remembers, certain
neurophysiological events occur in one’s brain. Moreover, these events are caused by earlier
neurophysiological process that were, in their turn, ultimately caused by the past events at the
time of the original experience (Debus 2008, 411). Similarly, the relation supervenes on spatial
and temporal relations because, as I mentioned initially, remembering requires that the subject
experienced the relevant event before. That is, the original experience must happen earlier than
the memory and there must be a causal connection with the original experience.1
In addition to the claim that memory requires a specific experiential relation to the past,
which Debus calls the Relation Claim, the relational view of memory requires us to make two
additional claims about the nature of recollective memories: the Constitution Claim (2008, 415)
and the Consciousness Claim (2008, 421). The Constitution Claim is the claim that past events
themselves are constitutive parts of mental occurrences of remembering. Thus, for a subject to
remember his tenth birthday party, it is necessary to make reference to his tenth birthday party
in order to individuate this memory as a memory of that particular event. Having a memory
as of his tenth birthday party—which may or may not have occurred—does not, according to
this view, suffice for the subject to count as genuinely remembering his tenth birthday party
in the same sense that, for relational views of perception, having a perceptual experience as
of a bird sitting on a fence does not suffice for a subject to count as perceiving the bird—
which may or may not be out there. The Consciousness Claim is, in contrast, the claim that
past events themselves are “constituent[s] of the conscious recollective experience itself” (2008,
406, author’s italics). According to Debus, “[t]his means that, when a subject [recollectively
remembers] a past object (or event), the past object (or event) is, for the [remembering] subject,
immediately available in consciousness.” (2008, 406). It is not entirely obvious what she has
in mind here, but the thought seems to be that recollective memories are transparent (Harman
1Debus frames this idea in terms of the original experience and the memory being in the same “spatiotempo-
ral path” traced by the subject in the world. According to her, by inhabiting the world, subjects trace a certain
“spatiotemporal path”, and to count as remembering something, the spatiotemporal point in which the memory
occurs must precede the spatiotemporal point in which the experience occurred, and both must belong to the same
“spatiotemporal path”.
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1990; Tye 2000), namely, when one remembers, one is not consciously aware of the properties of
one’s conscious experience, but rather of the properties of the objects of awareness themselves—
in the case of recollective memory, the properties of the past events or objects themselves.
These three claims—the Relation Claim, the Constitution Claim, and the Consciousness
Claim—sit at the core of the relational view of memory, and they help us to see more clearly
what the relational view is a view of. In addition to being a claim about the objects of memory—
i.e., that memory is of past events, and hence that one needs to be related to those events (causally
or otherwise) in order to count as remembering—it is also a claim about the nature of memory as
a mental state. In other words, it is claim about the metaphysics of memory—i.e., what it takes
to individuate a mental state as a recollective memory of an event—and a claim about the phe-
nomenology of memory—i.e., what it is like to recollectively remember an event. While Debus
does not say anything explicit to this effect, her heavy reliance on naı¨ve realist and disjunctivist
approaches to perception (2008, 408; 414), such as the ones developed by Martin (2004) and
Campbell (2002), suggests that her relational view tries to avoid committing to the presence of
representations to account for memory as a mental state.2 While, in general, representationalists
would agree that the objects of recollective memory are indeed past events, they would deny that
such a relation is established by an experiential relation along Debus’s line (see Bernecker 2008;
Robins 2016b; Michaelian 2016c; Sant’Anna 2018a; Ferna´ndez 201x). Instead, what character-
izes a mental state as a state of recollective memory is, for the representationalist, the fact that
it puts us in an intentional relation to the past, that is, a relation of representing those events.3
Thus, to illustrate with an example, what makes my memory of my tenth birthday party a mem-
ory of that event, and what accounts for the fact that I experience that memory as a memory of
2For a more detailed discussion of why relational views of perception are incompatible with representational
views, see Crane (2006); Genone (2016); Locatelli and Wilson (2017). In what follows, I will take it for granted
that one of the motivations for developing a relational account of memory is to avoid a representationalist account.
As mentioned above, it is true that Debus (2008) does not discuss this opposition in her paper, but I take it that, in
addition to her heavy reliance on the naı¨ve realist/relationalist literature in perception, the absence of any reference
to ‘representations’, ‘content’, ‘intentional properties’, ‘accuracy conditions’, and other similar terms that have
been systematically utilized by representationalists allows us to safely conclude that she intends her relational view
as an alternative account to representationalist accounts, even if she does so only implicitly. One may, of course,
plausibly argue that her view is committed to the presence of representations, but since Debus (2008) is silent on
this issue, settling it would require a much closer exegetical analysis of her work, a task that is beyond the scope of
this paper.
3It is important to note that representationalism, at least as understood in the context of the literature discussed
here, is only committed to the claim that memory is a representational state at the personal level. This is what it
means to say that representationalism and relationalism are opposing accounts of memory as a mental state. More
recently, some have argued that memory is not representational in the sense that the subpersonal processes respon-
sible for producing memories (understood as mental states) do not involve the manipulation of representations (e.g.,
Hutto and Myin 2017; Hutto and Peeters 2018; see Michaelian and Sant’Anna 2019 for discussion). The issue of
whether memory understood as a mental state is representational is, as these authors recognize, independent of
whether memory processes involve the manipulation of representations. Thus, whether or not a view is committed
to the idea that memory processes involve the manipulation of representations at the subpersonal level is tangential
to the issue separating representationalism and relationalism in the way that these views are understood here.
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that event, is that it represents my tenth birthday party, and not that it is experientially related
to, and hence is constituted by, that event. Given Debus’s three claims and her reliance on the
relationalist literature in perception, the relational view of memory can plausibly be seen as a
competing account to representationalism of the nature of memory as a mental state.4
In what follows, I will not be concerned with the Constitution Claim and the Consciousness
Claim, but only with the Relation Claim. For this reason, the argument that I will develop against
the relational view will remain neutral on whether the relational view provides a compelling
account of recollective memory as a mental state. My aim in this paper is more modest: I will
discuss in more detail the question of when, for the relational view, a subject can be said to be
genuinely remembering a past event. In other words, I will focus, from now on, on the question
of what an analysis of remembering is according to the relational view.
3 The relational analysis of remembering
While there are some indications of what a relational analysis of remembering is supposed to be
following the relational view, Debus does not develop this point in much detail.5 For this reason,
4While some may view the argument developed in the paper as an implicit endorsement of representationalism,
I shall not take a firm stand on the subject here. Recent work on the dispute between representationalism and rela-
tionalism in philosophy of perception suggests that they are not mutually exclusive views and hence that “hybrid”
views are possible (see Schellenberg 2010, 2011; Siegel 2010; Logue 2014; Hanna 2015; Sant’Anna 2018b). In
fact, in a recent paper, Sant’Anna (2018a) has made a first attempt to propose a hybrid account of memory along
these lines. Another promising approach would be to think about hybrid views in relation to the distinction be-
tween conceptual and nonconceptual content (see Russell and Hanna 2012; Hanna 2015). In particular, the notion
of nonconceptual content developed by Hanna (2015), which sits at the core of his hybrid account of perception,
seems to provide a promising starting point for hybrid approaches to memory. This is because, once we understand
spatiotemporal representations in episodic memory within a Kantian framework, as has been suggested by Russell
and Hanna (2012) and Hanna (2015), we can have a view that avoids various pressing problems for relational ap-
proaches to memory, such as the co-temporality problem and the problem of how we can be directly aware of the
past (see Bernecker 2008; Sant’Anna and Michaelian 2019), while at the same time preserving core relationalist
and representationalist claims. Since, however, hybrid approaches still continue to be largely unexplored in the
memory literature, I will not discuss them any further.
5In a more recent paper, Debus (2010) offers an analysis of remembering that tries to supplement the analysis
offered by the causal theory of memory (see footnote 6) by adding an extra criterion, not present in the causal
theory itself, according to which a subject counts as remembering only if the memory representation is epistemically
relevant for the subject—i.e., the subject believes that he is remembering. In the following discussion, I will not
appeal to the Debus’s 2010 paper in my attempt to outline an analysis of remembering in line with the relational
view for two reasons. The first is that it is not obvious how the 2010 paper relates to the 2008 paper, which is
the focus of my discussion. As I pointed out before, there are good reasons to view the 2008 paper as an attempt
to provide a non-representational account of memory. However, due to its close reliance on the analysis offered
by the causal theory of memory, which has often been interpreted as a representational account—and, in my view,
rightly so, for one of the conditions it ascribes to remembering makes explicit reference to accuracy conditions—
the 2010 paper seems to be in tension with the overall proposal of the 2008 paper. It may be that they belong
to two different projects, or that Debus simply changed her mind, but since it is beyond my scope to provide a
comprehensive criticism of her work, I will not speculate any further here. The second reason why the 2010 paper
will not be further discussed is because, even if we were to set aside the worries about the coherence of the views
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I propose that we start by looking at the analysis offered by the causal theory of memory,6
which is the dominant theory in the literature, and then modify it appropriately to fit with the
relational view. Before proceeding, it is important to note that the causal theory and the relational
view are engaged in two distinctive projects, which are themselves constrained by different
considerations. The causal theory is ultimately an attempt to offer an analysis of remembering.
The relational view is, in contrast, an attempt to offer an account of the nature of memory as
a mental state. Thus, in what follows, I will discuss an analysis of remembering that takes the
relational account of memory as a mental state as a starting point.
According to Martin and Deutscher (1966), who provided the original formulation of the
causal theory, a subject S will count as remembering an event e iff:
(1) S has previously experienced e;
(2) S has a present mental representation of e;
(3) S stands in an appropriate causal relationship to e;
(4) The content of S’s present representation is sufficiently similar to the content of S’s pre-
vious experience.7
To illustrate, consider my putative memory M of my tenth birthday party. According to Martin
and Deutscher, M is an instance of remembering because: (1) I had a previous experience of
my tenth birthday party, which led me to form representations of this event; (2) I have a current
representation M of my tenth birthday party; (3) my actual representation M is caused, perhaps
by means of a memory trace, by my past experience of the party; and (4) the content of M is
sufficiently similar to the content of the past experience—e.g., I remember my parents being
there, I remember having chocolate cake, and so on, which were all represented in my previ-
ous perceptual experience of the party. (1)–(4) are, therefore, necessary and jointly sufficient
conditions to say that a subject count as remembering.
Now, can (1)–(4) be incorporated into a relational analysis of remembering? Let’s consider
(1) first. Since Debus says quite explicitly that successful remembering requires that subjects
have experienced the relevant events in the past, and this is central to make sense of the notion of
an experiential relation, it seems that (1) can be straightforwardly incorporated into the relational
defended in the 2008 and the 2010 paper, the novel condition discussed by the 2010 paper—the epistemic relevance
condition—would not help addressing the problems raised later on in the paper, for all the cases discussed there are
epistemically relevant for the subject.
6For the original formulation of the causal theory, see Martin & Deutscher (1966). For more recent develop-
ments, see Bernecker (2010) and Cheng and Werning (2016). For helpful discussions, see Robins (2016b) and
Michaelian and Robins (2018)
7This formulation is adapted from Bernecker (2010, ch. 1). See also Bernecker (2015, 302).
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analysis. The same is true of (3). That is, the experiential relation is said to supervene on causal
and spatiotemporal relations holding between subjects and events. However, (2) and (4) do not
seem compatible with the relational view. As I pointed out before, Debus (2008) is not very
explicit on whether or not she thinks that remembering can involve some sort of representation.
However, there are good reasons to think that it does not. The first reason is that, later on in
the paper, Debus says that experiential relations are supposed to make subjects directly aware
of the past events—this is the Consciousness Claim discussed above. So, when one remembers,
it is not the case that one’s awareness of the event is mediated, which eliminates the need for
representations.8 The second reason is that Debus frames her view in relation to Martin’s (2004)
relational view of perception, which avoids representations altogether. While Debus says quite
explicitly that her understanding of mnemonic awareness differs in important respects from what
is usually understood by perceptual awareness—although she says very little about what the
differences are supposed to be—it looks like that the same, or at least very similar, motivations
drive both the relational view of memory and relational views of perception. This does not,
of course, make a conclusive case against the presence of representations, but it gives us good
reasons to cast doubt on the inclusion of (2) and (4) into the relational analysis.
Thus, by looking at the analysis proposed by Martin and Deutscher (1966), we can use (1)
and (3) as starting points to conceive of a relational analysis of remembering. Considered alone,
however, (1) and (3) provide only a partial picture of a relational analysis. The reason is that,
for the relational view, the relationship that subjects have to past events is not merely causal. In
order to provide a more complete picture, the relational analysis needs to require that subjects
stand in an experiential relation to the relevant events, which takes into account not only a
causal relation, but spatial and temporal relations as well. On this view, then, the relational view
of memory offered by Debus seems to suggest that S remembers e iff:
(R1) S has previously experienced e;
(R2) S is presently experientially related to e by undergoing a mental state M ; where the ex-
periential relation supervenes on specific causal, spatial, and temporal relations obtaining
between S and e.
To illustrate with the same example as above, the relational view says that I remember my tenth
birthday party because (R1) I had a previous perceptual experience of the party, and (R2) I am
experientially related to the party in the sense that my memory is caused by it and the party is
located at a spatiotemporal point that precedes the actual spatiotemporal point in which I have
8Although see Bernecker (2008, ch. 5), who claims that the presence of representations in memory is not
incompatible with a form of direct realism. I will leave this issue aside as it is not clear whether Bernecker’s view
is a genuine form of direct realism.
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the memory. On this view, then, (R1) and (R2) are viewed as necessary and jointly sufficient
conditions to say that a subject count as remembering.
One important clarification at this point refers to the nature of the mental state M in (R2).
Since, on the relational view, M cannot be understood as a representational state, one natural
question would be what M is according to the relational view. The traditional move by rela-
tionalists in perception is to understand P—the non-representational state counterpart of M in
perception—as being a more basic form of acquaintance with particular objects in the external
world, such that those objects become constitutive parts of perceptual experiences (see Martin
2004; Fish 2009; Brewer 2011). As Fish puts it nicely, the objects “shape the contours of the
subject’s conscious experience by actually being the contours of the subject’s conscious experi-
ence” (2009, 6). Similarly, in the case of memory, one might understand M as a more basic form
of acquaintance with the past, in which the past events become constitutive parts of mnemonic
states. This seems to be what Debus has in mind when she talks about memory making us di-
rectly aware of the past, although, I should note again, she is careful to make explicit that the
kind of awareness involved in memory differs in important senses from the kind of awareness
involved in perception (see Debus 2008, 408).9
Now, the relational analysis stated above is intended as a response to the general question of
what is it to remember, as opposed to, e.g., the questions of what is it to perceive or what is it
to imagine. However, a complete theory of remembering should not only distinguish between
remembering and other mental phenomena, but also adequately distinguish between different
ways in which remembering can occur. And here the distinction between successful and un-
successful occurrences of remembering becomes crucial.10 Successful remembering refers to,
roughly speaking, cases where we remember things as they happened. Unsuccessful remem-
bering, in contrast, can take two different forms. The first is misremembering (Robins 2016a),
9One worry that one may have here is that relying on Martin and Deutscher’s (1966) classical analysis is unfair
to the relationalist. This is because Martin and Deutscher’s view is allegedly a representational one and, as such, the
analysis provided by them is bound to be incompatible with relationalism. In response, I would like to make it clear
that the reasons for relying on Martin and Deutscher’s analysis are two: first, it is by far the most prominent anal-
ysis of remembering in the recent literature, so it has shaped virtually all subsequent attempts at such an analysis;
and second, and more importantly, alternative causal theories of remembering, including Debus’s (2008) relational
account, have relied on Martin and Deutscher’s account more or less systematically (see Michaelian and Robins
2018 for discussion). More to the point, though, the fact that Martin and Deutscher’s original analysis is a represen-
tational analysis does not harm my current project. Condition (R1), which is the same as Martin and Deutscher’s
condition (1), and condition (R2), which is the relational version of Martin and Deutscher’s condition (3), are non-
representational conditions, and consequently, they do not require any commitment to representationalism—the
representational conditions, (2) and (4), have been consistently rejected precisely because they rely on a form of
representationalism. Moreover, the motivation for endorsing conditions (R1) and (R2) do not come from some
veiled commitment to Martin and Deutscher’s original theory; instead, these conditions reflect central claims of the
relational view espoused by Debus, as was discussed in more detail above.
10At this point, some relationalists might want to object that they do not need to be concerned with this, as what
I am calling “unsuccessful remembering” is not actually a form of remembering, but a mental state of another kind
entirely. I address this objection in more detail in the next section.
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which corresponds to cases where we get some details of an event right, but get some other de-
tails of an event wrong.11 The second is confabulation (Hirstein 2005; Michaelian 2018; Robins
2018), which corresponds to cases where we get all the details wrong—i.e., the event remem-
bered did not happen. Since the presence of an experiential relation is central to the relational
analysis, one would expect that its presence or its absence would provide a meaningful way
to distinguish between successful and unsuccessful remembering. In fact, this seems to be the
suggestion behind Debus’s (2008) overall proposal. However, it is not entirely clear whether
this will work. In the next section, I will argue that (R2), or the requirement for the presence
of an experiential relation, is neither necessary nor sufficient to distinguish successful and un-
successful remembering, and thus that the relational analysis, as formulated in here, is at best
incomplete.
4 Unsuccessful remembering
The problem of unsuccessful remembering and its relationship to the relational view of memory
view has not been explored in much detail. In the perception literature, however, forms of
what we might call unsuccessful perception—i.e., illusions and hallucinations—have proven
to pose real challenges for relational views of perception (see Smith 2002; Crane and French
2017). The main reason for this is that successful or veridical occurrences of perception can
be indistinguishable, from the point of view of the subject, from unsuccessful or non-veridical
ones. Thus, when relationalists say that perception is an experiential relation to the perceived
objects, they need to explain how and why there can be phenomenologically indistinguishable
perceptual experiences both in the presence and in the absence of the objects perceived.
The same problem, I think, arises for relational views of memory. Successful and unsuc-
cessful remembering can often be phenomenologically indistinguishable, which questions the
necessity of there being an experiential relation to past events when one remembers. In the same
way in which I can seemingly see a spider on the wall and fail to realize that there is not a spider
on the wall, I can seemingly remember an event, e.g., my tenth birthday party, and fail to realize
that this event did not happen. However, if I can seemingly remember an event when it did not
occur, and hence undergo the same mental state as the one I would have undergone had the event
11I should say that this is not necessarily what Robins understands by misremembering. For Robins,
“[m]isremembering is a memory error that relies on successful retention of the targeted event” (2016a, 433), which
is paradigmatically illustrated by the DRM effect, where the content of what is misremembered is non-trivially
related to the content of what is remembered or retrieved—e.g., subjects are more likely to misremember seeing
particular fruits, such as bananas, if the content of what is remembered or retrieved also involves fruits, such as
apples and oranges. The definition of misremembering that I am using here does not require such a non-trivial re-
lation. According to this definition, one misremembers if the content of what is misremembered was not originally
experienced.
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been the case, then it does not seem to make sense to postulate a relationship to such event as
necessary for remembering. That is, the fact that one can seemingly remember an event when
the event did not happen “screens off” (Martin 2004) any explanatory role played by the past
events in one’s theory of memory.
One strategy popular among relationalists about perception is to resort to a disjunctivist view
of perception. There are different varieties of disjunctivism (see Byrne and Logue 2008), but
one popular characterization is that, at the most fundamental level, successful or veridical and
unsuccessful or non-veridical perceptual experiences do not share any essential features. In
other words, they are viewed as occurrences of two different kinds (see Snowdon 1980; Martin
2004; Fish 2009). Thus, if disjunctivism is true, it is no longer a problem to say that veridical
perceptual experiences are relational, while non-veridical ones are not. In her discussion of
“memory hallucinations”, which I have called “confabulations” here, Debus (2008) employs
the same strategy. Inspired by Martin’s (2004) disjunctivist account of perception, she says
that the fact that two mental occurrences are indiscriminable from a subjective point of view
does not imply that they are mental occurrences of the same kind. For Debus, the absence of the
experiential relation in the case of the so-called memory hallucinations postulates a fundamental
separation between them and successful remembering (2008, 414). This explains why, despite
being phenomenologically indistinguishable, successful memories are relational and memory
hallucinations, or confabulations, are not.
Thus, if combined with disjunctivism, the relational analysis can provide a principled way
to distinguish successful remembering from at least one kind of unsuccessful remembering,
namely, what Debus calls “memory hallucinations”, or what I have called “confabulations”.
However, I think that, even with disjunctivism, the relational analysis fails to provide a satisfac-
tory way to distinguish between successful and unsuccessful remembering. The main reason,
as I will argue in section 4.1, is that memory hallucinations or confabulations do satisfy (R2)
above, so there is no principled way to say that they are fundamentally distinct from successful
remembering. But before I turn to this question, let me define more precisely what I will under-
stand by unsuccessful remembering. As I said before, unsuccessful remembering can take two
forms. The first form, misremembering, is when we remember incorrectly one or more details
of an event that occurred. The second form, confabulation, is when we remember an event that
did not occur at all.
To illustrate, consider misremembering first. Consider, for instance, my memory of my
tenth birthday party. I remember my parents being there, I remember it being a sunny day, and
I remember having chocolate cake. While this memory is about an event that happened, at least
one of its elements incorrectly describe the event; that is, it was a rainy rather than a sunny day.
So, despite being about an event that happened, and despite getting some details right—i.e., my
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parents were there and I had chocolate cake—I mis-remember the event in question. Consider
confabulations now. Suppose that I remember being to Moscow when I was a teenager. Since
I have never been to Russia, this memory will count as an occurrence of confabulation because
the event in question did not happen.12
Now that we have a clearer understanding of what unsuccessful remembering is, I will move
on to show why it poses a problem for the relational view of memory. Section 4.1 will discuss
confabulations and Section 4.2 will discuss misremembering. My main argument will be that
both forms of unsuccessful remembering instantiate the relevant experiential relation to past
events and hence that the relational analysis of remembering fails to properly distinguish them
from successful remembering.
4.1 The problem of confabulation
Can the relational analysis of remembering rule out cases of confabulations? To answer this
question, we should go back to (R1) and (R2) above. For the relational view, S remembers e iff:
(R1) S has previously experienced e;
(R2) S is presently experientially related to e by undergoing a mental state M ; where the ex-
periential relation supervenes on specific causal, spatial, and temporal relations obtaining
between S and e.
The question is, then, whether there are cases of confabulation that satisfy (R1) and (R2). The
most obvious way to rule out cases of confabulation would be to appeal to (R1). Since the events
that one confabulates have not happened, it is not possible that one experienced those events in
the past. Therefore, confabulations do not satisfy (R1) and are thus distinct from occurrences of
successful remembering. While I think this provides a satisfactory way to deal with some cases
of confabulations,13 it does not seem to reflect the motivation behind the relational view. When
she introduces disjunctivism to deal with confabulations, Debus argues that confabulations are
distinct in kind from successful remembering because, in the former case, the relevant experi-
ential relationship fails to obtain. So, at least on Debus’s version of the relational view, it is the
12With the exception of a few remarks about “memory hallucinations”, Debus (2008) says very little about
memory errors, so the criticism that I will present in the following sections relies mostly on a characterization of
unsuccessful remembering at play in recent debates in the philosophical literature. How to characterize memory
errors and how to account for them are lively and controversial questions in the current literature, so I shall not take
a stand on them, but the basic distinction between misremembering and confabulating utilized here seems to be
relatively uncontroversial. For more discussions about misremembering and its relationship to current theories of
remembering, see Robins (2016a) and Michaelian (2016b). For discussions about confabulation in particular, see
Hirstein (2005), Robins (2018), and Michaelian (2018), and for discussions about the relationship of confabulation
to current theories of remembering, see Michaelian (2016b; 2018), Bernecker (2017), and Robins (2017; 2018).
13As I will argue below, it fails to account for cases of veridical confabulations (Michaelian 2016b).
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presence of (R2), and not of (R1), that provides the means to distinguish confabulations from
successful remembering.
I will come back to (R1) later. For now, let us focus on (R2), as it is the central element
of Debus’s view. The question now is, therefore, whether (R2) can provide a meaningful way
to distinguish successful occurrences of remembering from confabulations. To start with, it is
important to note that (R2) will be successful in providing such distinction only if we make
the further assumption that, to successfully remember, subjects must be in a unique experiential
relation to a unique past event. That being the case, the claim that confabulations do not count
as successful remembering becomes straightforwardly true, for there is no unique experiential
relation holding between the subject and the confabulated event, as the event in question did
not happen. However, the relational view does not require us to make that assumption. The
claim is simply that successful remembering instantiates the relevant experiential relation, while
confabulations do not. Thus, if one does not make this assumption, it is not hard to envisage
cases where confabulations instantiate experiential relations to past events in the way described
by (R2).
To make this clear, let me introduce the notion of a partial experiential relation.14 A partial
experiential relation is similar to the one described in (R2), that is, it supervenes on the causal,
spatial, and temporal relations between a subject S and a past event e. However, because of
its partiality, the partial experiential relation only makes the subject aware of some but not all
the constituents, or properties, of e. For example, I can be in a partial experiential relation to
my tenth birthday party, such that I can remember having chocolate cake next to my parents,
but fail to remember other elements, including that this memory is of my tenth birthday party.
Suppose, now, that I remember an event that did not happen. Because the event did not happen,
the relational view says that there cannot possibly be an experiential relation between the subject
and the event, thus making this an occurrence of confabulation. But, it does not follow from this
that the confabulation fails to put the subject in partial experiential relations to past events. It
could be the case—and I will argue later that there are good reasons to believe that this is actually
the case—that the confabulation puts the subject in two or more partial experiential relations to
two or more past events, such that he becomes aware of different constituents or features of
multiple events as belonging to a unique event. Consider, for instance, my memory of having
pizza at the beach. While I have never experienced such an event, it is true that I have previously
experienced the following two different events: one in which I had pizza and another one in
14I am not suggesting here that Debus (2008) herself is committed to partial experiential relations. While I
believe that her view does not require us to commit to full experiential relations, I think that such a commitment
is an underlying assumption of her proposal. However, as I will argue in what follows, the commitment to full
experiential relations leaves relationalists with an overly restrictive account of remembering in light of research on
the constructive character of remembering. Appealing to partial experiential relations, I will suggest, is the best
way to avoid this worry in a relationalist framework.
13
which I was at the beach. So, if the notion of a partial experiential relation is sound, there is
no reason why I could not be aware of the confabulated event by being partially experientially
related to two or more events that I experienced previously.15 However, if that is the case, then
nothing prevents confabulations from putting us in experiential relations to past events.
One way for relationalists to avoid this problem would be to simply bite the bullet and add
the additional clause that a mental state counts as successful remembering only if it makes
the subject experientially related to a unique event. However, I think that this move should
be resisted. If correct, it would lead to a restrictive, and hence counterintuitive, account of
remembering. To see this, suppose that I have a putative memory M of my tenth birthday party,
where I remember having chocolate cake with my parents and my friends. Since this event
happened, and since I experienced it, (R1) is satisfied. However, M is not brought about by my
being experientially related to the event of my tenth birthday party, but instead, by my being
partially experientially related to different events (see Michaelian 2011; Robins 2016b). In this
particular case, M puts me in a partial experiential relation to an event e1, where I had chocolate
cake, to an event e2, where I had a meal with my parents, and to an event e3, where I was
hanging out with my friends. In other words, my awareness of the three distinctive constituents
of M, namely, <having chocolate cake>, <having a meal with my parents>, <being with my
friends>, are awareness of constituents of different past events that are brought together by M.
If this is right, the claim that remembering requires a unique experiential relation will require
us to say that I am not remembering my tenth birthday party. But this is problematic for at least
two reasons. The first is that M above satisfies (R1) and, moreover, it is experientially related,
in a relevant sense, to past experiences. From a common sensical point of view, this seems to
be enough to say that one is successfully remembering, as one gets the relevant details right
and one does so in virtue of being (partially) experientially related to the past. The only thing
that is missing, arguably, is that the event that M purportedly makes me aware of, namely, my
tenth birthday party, is not operative—i.e., it is not the ultimate cause—in producing M (see
Martin and Deutscher 1966, p. 166). Thus, it might be argued that, despite seeming so, M does
not count as a successful occurrence of remembering because none of the experiential relations
trace back to the original event, which is precisely what is required to say that M allows me to
be aware of my tenth birthday party.
This answer will, however, provide only a temporary solution. The reason is that, while the
15One worry here is that it is difficult to see how a subject could enjoy a single and unified conscious experience
of remembering an event if multiple experiential relations constitute a single memory. For my present purposes, I
am taking this for granted since, as it will become clear later, I think that appealing to partial experiential relations is
the best strategy available for relationalists to make sense of the constructive character of remembering. However,
if this turns out to be correct, then the question of how multiple experiential relations allow for a unified conscious
experience in remembering will need to be properly addressed by relationalists. This point is discussed in more
detail below.
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relational view might be able to rule out cases where none of the partial experiential relations
trace back to the past event itself, it will not be able to rule out cases where at least one of the
partial experiential relations establish such relation. Consider the case above again. Suppose
that my partial awareness of <having chocolate cake> is, in fact, awareness of myself having
chocolate cake in my tenth birthday party. However, my awareness of <having a meal with my
parents> and of <being with my friends> are partial awarenesses of constituents of different
events, i.e., e2 and e3. In this case, then, there is at least one experiential relation that traces back
to the relevant past event, and thus M should count as a successful occurrence of remembering
even if there is more than one experiential relation connecting M to multiple past events. Requir-
ing the presence of a unique experiential relation is, therefore, too restrictive, which provides a
counterintuitive account of memory.
So far, I have attempted to show that, from an intuitive point of view, requiring a unique
experiential relation is implausible. However, relationalists might resist this by saying that they
do not share our intuitions. To put it sharply, the claim here would be that, for relationalism, if
there is not a unique experiential relation holding between the subject and the event remembered,
then, intuitively, the subject’s putative memory will not be an occurrence of successful remem-
bering. This leads us to the second problem with the idea that remembering requires a unique
experiential relation. While I think that this response is, in principle, open to relationalists, I do
not think it is a promising one. The reason is that it provides an analysis of remembering that
starts by stipulating what the phenomenon must be, instead of describing or explaining what the
phenomenon actually is. The problem with this approach is that our theoretical intuitions do not
always correspond to how the phenomenon actually is, which runs the risk of making our initial
stipulations empty or explanatorily uninteresting.
And this, I think, is the problem with this strategy. In other words, it has been shown by
empirical research that memory is constructive, in the sense that our memories are constructed
from different sources other than the original experience (Schacter et al. 2007, 2012; Addis
2018). Some authors, such as Michaelian (2011), have suggested that while some causal link
must be preserved to the past experience that the memory is about, not all the elements or
constituents that figure into that memory need to be derived from the original experience. Such
elements can come from different sources, such as semantic information (Cheng and Werning
2016; Cheng et al. 2016) or background knowledge (Suddendorf and Corballis 1997) present in
retrieval (see also De Brigard 2014 and Michaelian 2016c). Based on this and other empirical
findings, De Brigard (2014) has suggested, for example, that it is not unsurprising that most
of the occurrences of remembering that we call “successful” will have elements that are not
drawn from the original experience. Setting the details of this debate aside, the point is that
how memory works, or how remembering happens in the world, does not seem to support the
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prior relationalist theoretical intuition that a unique experiential relation to the past event must
be characteristic of successful remembering. If that was the case, most of the occurrences of
remembering that we call “successful” would be actually unsuccessful. So, again, appealing
to the presence of a unique experiential relation provides a restrictive, and hence inadequate,
account of how memory works. Relationalists are thus faced with a dilemma: either they commit
to full experiential relations, in which case they will end up with an overly restrictive account of
remembering, or they commit to the notion of partial experiential relations, in which case their
account would be too permissive, for confabulations would count as instances of remembering.
Before proceeding, I should pause to address two objections. The first says that acknowl-
edging that memory is constructive and that multiple causal connections may influence memory
retrieval does not require us to give up on the idea that remembering involves a unique experi-
ential relation to a past event. This is because, the objection goes, construction and influence
from multiple causal factors are not incompatible with the idea that a single past event, e, plays a
continued role in producing memories of e.16 While this kind of response is available for causal
theorists when dealing with problems raised by the constructive character of memory, it is not
available for the relational view. This is because it is a mistake to interpret experiential relations
as being mere causal relations in the sense used by causal theorists. For the causal theory, a
causal relation is often established by means of a memory trace, which stores information from
experience that is later retrieved to produce memory representations. Experiential relations do
not, however, reduce to memory traces, or to any internal brain state for that matter. As Debus
(2008, 419–20) points outs in her discussion of the Relation Claim, the causal relation between
a memory and an event is just one of the elements that characterize an experiential relation,
the other two being spatial and temporal relations. More importantly to my purposes, unlike
memory traces as typically understood by causal theorists, experiential relations are supposed
put us in a relation of acquaintance with the past events—that is, a conscious relation to the
things that we are experientially related to. So, while, for the causal theory, it is possible for a
subject to form a memory of a single event e when multiple memory traces are operative in pro-
ducing that memory, this is not possible in the context of the relational view unless one appeals
to the notion of a partial experiential relation introduced earlier. Without the latter notion, how-
ever, one would end up with a view in which most of our memories would make us consciously
aware of multiple events due to the presence of multiple experiential relations, which is clearly
implausible.
The second objection says that, while it may be true that the relational view provides a re-
strictive view of memory in relation to empirical research, it does not necessarily follow that it
is an inadequate one. Here, the relationalist could argue that an analysis of remembering may,
16I’m indebted to an anonymous referee for raising this objection.
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but need not, be aligned with an account of how the cognitive mechanisms underlying memory
work. In essence, this is an instance of the more general—and highly controversial—question of
how important empirical considerations are for philosophical analysis, a question that I do not
expect to answer here. So, relationalists might well want to avail themselves of this strategy and
claim, in response to the argument above, that it is not the business of philosophical analysis to
try to make sense of empirical results, thus dismissing the argument that the relational view is
restrictive and consequently inadequate. I think, however, that this is not a particularly promis-
ing line of response, for it is based on a highly controversial claim that will require substantial
argumentation to be established. In saying this, though, I do not mean to endorse the equally
controversial claim that philosophical analysis should be strictly about making sense of empir-
ical results—a claim that also needs substantial argumentation to be established—but only the
relatively uncontroversial and weaker claim that philosophical analysis must be broadly sensible
to empirical results. Thus, once this latter claim is in place, the fact that a view is restrictive on
the face of empirical results, as I argue is the case with the relational view, does serve as a good
indication of its inadequacy.
I have argued that (R2) does not provide a sufficient criterion to distinguish successful re-
membering from one form of unsuccessful remembering, i.e., confabulations, as is suggested by
Debus’s relational view. Before I move on to consider misremembering, let me come back to
the relationship between (R1) and confabulations. As I said initially, I think that relationalists
can satisfactorily rule out some cases of confabulation by appealing to (R1), as subjects have
not experienced the relevant events. The argument I gave so far only provides reasons to deny
that (R2) is neither necessary nor sufficient to draw the relevant distinction between successful
remembering and confabulation. The problem with placing the burden of the distinction on (R1)
is that it undermines the whole motivation for providing a relational account of memory. In
Debus’s (2008) version of the view, (R2) plays the explanatory role of distinguishing successful
remembering from unsuccessful remembering. This is suggested, among other things, by the
radical move that Debus makes in favor of disjunctivism. But if, as I argued, (R2) is not required
to draw the distinction, the question that poses itself is why give it a central place in one’s ac-
count of memory, so as to call it a relational view of memory, when, in reality, it is only playing
a marginal role in one’s analysis of remembering.
But even if we set this worry aside, relationalism would still provide an incomplete account
of confabulations. I have assumed throughout my discussion that confabulations are falsidical
occurrences of remembering, that is, that they are cases where subjects get things wrong. How-
ever, some authors have recently pointed to the possibility of veridical confabulations (Robins
2016a, 2017; Michaelian 2016b; Bernecker 2010), that is, cases where subjects get things right
by mere accident. The most intuitive analogy here, as Michaelian (2016b) points out, is to veridi-
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cal perceptual hallucinations (see Lewis 1980). Veridical hallucinations refer to cases where
subjects perceive the environment accurately, but the cause of the their perceptual experiences
is not the environment, but something else, such as evil scientists or some misfiring happening
at the neuronal level. Similarly, veridical confabulations are cases where subjects remember the
past correctly, but this is not due to their memories being adequately related to the past, but
due to something else, such as the malfunctioning of the underlying mechanisms responsible for
memory, or to the occurrence of processes not ordinarily associated with remembering, such as
guessing. Assuming that veridical confabulations are possible, and hence that a complete anal-
ysis of remembering must be able to distinguish them from falsidical confabulations, simply
appealing to (R1) would not provide such a distinction. Both veridical and falsidical confabula-
tions fail to satisfy (R1); and, for this reason, the relational view would mistakenly place these
two different occurrences of confabulations under the same category.
To summarize the discussion up to this point, I do not intend the argument above to offer
a definitive case against pursuing relational views in relation to confabulations. However, if
correct, then it shows that appealing solely to the notion of an experiential relation is not the
right way to go.
Before I move forward, I should address one objection that is likely to arise in the context
of the introduction of partial experiential relations. Some might argue that, even if there is
such a thing as a partial experiential relation, it cannot be used to characterize confabulations
appropriately. In particular, the claim is that partial experiential relations cannot explain the phe-
nomenology of confabulation. Like successful remembering, confabulations seemingly make us
aware of unique events; however, if they can be partially related to multiple events, as I have
suggested, it would follow that it is impossible for us to experience confabulations as involving
awareness of unique events. Instead, it would be more plausible to say that they make us aware
of a conjunction of two or more events. This would conflict, however, with how we experience
confabulations.
This worry can be resolved by noticing that, in partial experiential relations, we become
aware of parts or properties of events (Sant’Anna 2018a). For example, the event of my tenth
birthday party has different properties, such as “having chocolate cake”, “having a meal with
my family”, and so on. Being fully or wholly experientially related to this event would entail
that I would be aware of all the properties instantiated by this event. In contrast, in cases where
I am only partially experientially related to this event, I am aware of one or more (but not
all) of its properties, e.g., “I remember having chocolate cake”. Being aware of this particular
property does not, however, make me automatically aware of the event as a whole. So, when
confabulations put a subject in multiple partial experiential relations to different events, it is not
required that the subject experiences the confabulations as being composed by multiple events.
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Instead, the subject is aware of properties of multiple events that are somehow brought together
to consciousness. In a representationalist framework, the equivalent claim here would be that
different bits of representational content are brought together to form a new representation of a
unique event.
In addition, rather than being incapable of explaining the phenomenology of confabulation,
one might argue that, if there is no such thing as a partial experiential relation, relationalists can-
not offer a positive account of the phenomenology of confabulation. Because, in confabulations,
we are not fully or wholly aware of any events, it would not be possible for us to experience those
mental states as making us aware of events at all. One might, of course, retreat to a negative form
of disjunctivism here and simply claim that it is not the relationalist’s business to explain con-
fabulations, as those are different in kind from successful remembering.17 However, motivating
a view along these lines is no easy task, so unless relationalists are prepared to offer a positive
account of confabulation that does not involve partial experiential relations, the prospects of
relationalism will be even dimmer if it does not adopt the notion of partial experiential relations.
4.2 The problem of misremembering
I have argued that the relational analysis of remembering faces trouble to distinguish successful
remembering from the first form of unsuccessful remembering, which I have called confabu-
lations. I will now consider the second form of unsuccessful remembering, misremembering,
which poses another pressing problem for the relational view. The argument proposed in this
section is somewhat independent from the argument proposed in 4.1. I will argue that, even if we
put the problems pertaining to confabulations aside, the relational view still fails to distinguish
between successful remembering and misremembering.
As I discussed before, in cases of misremembering, one is aware of an event that one ex-
perienced, but one gets some details of the event wrong. Consider the birthday party example
above. Suppose that, instead of remembering having chocolate cake, I remember having straw-
berry cake. I get all the other details about the event right: I remember my parents and friends
being there, I remember it being a rainy day, and etc., but I remember the flavor of my birthday
cake wrong. In this case, I am arguably aware of an event that happened, but remember one
detail wrong—i.e., the flavor of my birthday cake.
How does the relational view distinguish successful remembering from misremembering?
To approach this question, we can employ the same strategy used in the case of confabulations,
that is, we can ask whether there are cases of misremembering that satisfy (R1) and (R2). Since
the events that are objects of misremembering have been experienced in the past, it seems un-
17For a similar “negative” strategy to deal with perceptual hallucinations, see Martin (2004); Fish (2009); Brewer
(2011)
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controversial that (R1) is satisfied. However, and this is where the problem that misremembering
poses for the relational view becomes more evident, because those events happened and were
experienced, it looks like that (R2) is also satisfied, for subjects stand in the right kind of ex-
periential relation to the events. But, if that is the case, then occurrences of misremembering
satisfy the criteria to be classified as successful remembering, which is implausible from the
perspective of the relational view.
There is one obvious way for relationalists to avoid this problem. This consists in denying
that, when I remember having strawberry cake at my tenth birthday party, I am misremembering
a past event that actually happened. Instead, the suggestion is that, precisely because I remember
myself having strawberry cake, and not chocolate cake, I am not remembering my tenth birthday
party, but some other event that did not happen. Thus, because the event in question did not
happen, and hence was not experienced by me, the putative memory does not qualify as an
occurrence of successful remembering because the relevant experiential relation fails to obtain.
In other words, my putative memory fails to satisfy both (R1) and (R2).
This solution faces three important problems. The first problem is that it will sound coun-
terintuitive to some. As I discussed before, it has been suggested by different researchers that
it is not uncommon for our memories to have elements that are not derived from a unique past
experience (see, e.g., Michaelian 2011; De Brigard 2014; Cheng and Werning 2016). Thus, it
is not surprising that those memories will often be composed by elements that were not present
in the original experience. However, it seems too strong to conclude from this that we are sys-
tematically failing to remember the events in question. This would mean that, whenever our
memories get some detail wrong, which, as De Brigard (2014) points out, happens quite often,
the brain mechanisms responsible for memory would be malfunctioning. Since this is an un-
desirable result, in order to avoid this and other related worries, it seems more reasonable to
say that, in misremembering, we are related to the events that happened, but for some reason or
another, we get one or more of the details wrong. This would allow us to say that, overall, the
system is functioning as it should, while still allowing for error to be present in its outputs, i.e.,
in the memories produced.
The second problem this solution faces relates to the issues raised in 4.1. We could, in
response, point out that, while it might be true that occurrences of misremembering fail to in-
stantiate unique experiential relation to events, nothing would prevent them from instantiating
multiple partial experiential relations to different events. Thus, relationalists would need to deal
with the same problems raised in the context of confabulations. In other words, they would need
to explain how it is possible for unsuccessful remembering to instantiate experiential relations
without making the relational view trivial. And finally, the third problem is that, even if we
set these worries aside, and grant relationalists that, when I misremember, my putative memory
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relates to an event that is different from my tenth birthday party, the relational view would still
provide an incomplete analysis of remembering. The reason is that it would conflate confab-
ulations and misremembering, thus failing to make sense of the differences between these two
forms of unsuccessful remembering. In other words, while the relational view might be able
to distinguish between successful from unsuccessful remembering, it will not be able to distin-
guish between forms of unsuccessful remembering because both misremembering and confab-
ulations are understood in terms of the absence of the relevant experiential relation. Therefore,
the relational view provides an inappropriate taxonomy of memory errors, and, consequently, an
incomplete analysis of remembering.
In response to the third problem, relationalists might want to deny that there is a real distinc-
tion between forms of unsuccessful remembering. The claim here would be that there is no real
difference between getting some and all of the details of a given event wrong; in other words,
the same process is taking place in both cases, i.e., the subject is ultimately unsuccessfully re-
membering events. Alternatively put, what I have been called misremembering so far is nothing
but a less extreme case of confabulation. Thus, if this is right, relationalism is not obliged to
provide a taxonomy of memory errors along the lines proposed here.
This move, I think, faces similar problems to the move discussed in 4.1 that attempts to
deny that, by definition, there cannot be occurrences of successful remembering that instantiate
partial experiential relations. In other words, it runs the risk of forcing our theoretical intuitions
into our analysis of the phenomenon in question. While it is not logically incoherent to say
that misremembering is nothing but a form of confabulation, this does not seem to reflect how
misremembering and confabulations actually happen in the world. As De Brigard (2014) points
out, occurrences of what I have called misremembering should not be seen as “bad” products of
our memory systems; instead, they are the expected outcomes given how those systems work.
Confabulations, in contrast, occur in situations where something has clearly gone wrong, such
as when subjects suffer head injuries that lead to some sort of brain damage (see Hirstein 2005;
Bernecker 2017; Michaelian 2018 for more discussion). As Michaelian (2016b) points out,
while both misremembering and confabulations share the feature of being both erroneous—in
his terminology, they are both “inaccurate”—unlike misremembering, which is produced by
mechanisms that are working in a reliable manner, confabulations are produced by mechanisms
that are working unreliably (see also Hirstein 2005 for a similar account of confabulations). So,
it looks like that the workings of the systems responsible for misremembering and confabulation
differ in important senses.
Another problem, which is epistemological in nature, is that misremembering, but not con-
fabulation, seems to put us in a position to know at least some things about the past in a reli-
able manner. In her recent account of misremembering, Robins (2016a) notes that, “[w]hereas
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misrememberings result from the distortion of retained information, confabulations are wholly
inaccurate, reflecting no influence of retained information from a particular past event” (2016a,
434). In other words, despite involving distortion, misremembering can still provide us with
some useful information about the relevant events because there is some retention of informa-
tion from the past, which is not the case with confabulations. Thus, as Robins puts it, “[t]he
distinction between misremembering and confabulation is particularly important” (2016a, 434).
In summary, the main point is that, if relationalists want to pursue this path, they will need to
provide independent reasons, which are not derived from their initial theoretical motivations, to
consider misremembering as being just another form of confabulation. It is not clear, however,
whether there are such reasons. In fact, recent work on the subject seems to suggest that it is
the other way around. In the absence of such reasons, then, relationalism becomes vulnerable to
criticism relating to its failure to provide a picture of remembering that is sensitive to research on
unsuccessful remembering. So, denying that there is a real distinction between misremembering
and confabulation is likely to bring more problems than solutions for relationalists.
5 Conclusion
To conclude, I will discuss one worry that might arise in relation to my discussion of unsuccess-
ful remembering and two potential objections to the overall project of the paper. Concerning
unsuccessful remembering, one might (rightly) point out that my characterization of unsuccess-
ful remembering implicitly assumes that the erroneous or distorted elements of memory have
to be derived from different experiential sources. However, that is not necessarily the case, as
the erroneous elements in some forms of misremembering, such as DRM cases, need not de-
rive from any experiential source.18 In response, I would like to clarify that, despite focusing
on those cases here, I am not committed to the idea that memory errors are necessarily cases
where the erroneous elements are derived from experiential sources. Indeed, in DRM cases, it
looks like that appealing to non-experiential elements, such as semantic information influencing
retrieval, is more adequate to explain the occurrence of those errors. So, my argument here is
not meant to apply to those cases. However, when we look at them more closely, it looks like
that the relational view will also have trouble to explain the occurrence of those forms of misre-
membering. The reason why accounting for error in terms of the influence played by semantic
information present at the time of retrieval is appealing is that a form of representationalism is
assumed beforehand. In other words, because memory is taken to be a representational state,
there is no mystery in how the content of semantic memories, or semantic information more gen-
erally, can distort the content of episodic memories. This alternative is not, however, available
18I’m grateful to Sarah Robins for calling my attention to this issue.
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to relationalists, for it is not clear whether talk of representation can be coherently integrated
into their accounts. So, relationalists will also be required to provide an account of those cases
in addition to the ones that were discussed here.
Now, the first potential objection that can be raised to the overall argument of the paper
is that the relational view is an attempt to characterize successful remembering only, so it is
beyond its scope to provide an account of unsuccessful remembering. In response, I would like
to point out that, even if we grant that the unique goal of relationalism is to provide an analysis
of successful remembering alone, this analysis needs to be capable of distinguishing between
successful remembering from other mental states if it is going to be successful. So, even if
relationalists cannot provide an account of what distinguishes different forms of unsuccessful
remembering, such as misremembering and confabulating, from one another, it needs to explain
how successful remembering differs from unsuccessful remembering more generally. However,
if I am correct, current relationalist accounts have not been successful in doing that, for as I
have shown in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, cases of misremembering and confabulating are wrongly
characterized as occurrences of successful remembering by them.
Finally, the second potential objection that can be raised to the overall argument of the paper
is that the relational analysis provided here is incomplete and hence that I did not succeed in
dismissing relationalism altogether. While I agree that a knockdown argument against relation-
alism will require a more detailed argument than the one I provided here, I do not think that
acknowledging this fact poses a problem for my argument, for it was not the goal of the paper to
provide a definite argument against relationalism. Instead, the goal, which is stated from the out-
set, was to show that unsuccessful remembering raises crucial problems for the relational view
of memory. To make the case for this claim, I provided a relational analysis of remembering that
is intended to capture the relational account offered by Debus (2008) and showed that, viewed
from the perspective of such an analysis, the relational account does not have the required re-
sources to account for memory errors. Thus, my argument does not rule out the possibility of
there being alternative relational accounts of remembering that can account for errors, but the
burden of developing such accounts is with the relationalist. So, the paper accomplishes its main
goal, which is to show that there are important tensions between the most prominent relational
account in the literature and research on memory errors.
To summarize, the goal of this paper was to argue that the most prominent version of the
relational view of memory in the recent literature, the one developed by Debus (2008), is unable
to handle unsuccessful remembering. This has been accomplished by, first, producing a rela-
tional analysis of remembering compatible with the relational view defended by Debus (2008),
and second, by considering how such analysis of remembering deals with unsuccessful remem-
bering or memory errors. I argued that the relational view, in its current form, cannot properly
23
distinguish between successful remembering and different forms of unsuccessful remembering.
I did that by distinguishing between two ways in which unsuccessful remembering can happen:
misremembering and confabulation. I argued that the requirement for the presence of an experi-
ential relation, as proposed by Debus (2008), is neither necessary nor sufficient for remembering.
This is because there are, on the one hand, cases of remembering that do not instantiate the rel-
evant experiential relations, and, on the other hand, cases of confabulation and misremembering
that do instantiate the relevant experiential relations. For this reason, if the relational view is to
be successful in the context of empirical research on memory; more specifically, in the context
of empirical research on memory errors, it will need to provide extra considerations to show
how it can deal with such occurrences.
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